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Agenda item 140
UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 28 June 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to write to request that the enclosed document entitled "Who are the 'Brothers to the Rescue' and what are their goals?" (see annex) be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 140, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bruno RODRÍGUEZ PARRILLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

[Original: English and Spanish]

Who are the "Brothers to the Rescue" and what are their goals?

Since its foundation, this organization has been involved in actions against Cuba's territorial integrity and sovereignty, initially disguising its political objectives under alleged "rafter" rescue actions, which they also used to profit from.

As recognized now by the United States authorities, Brothers to the Rescue has a vast record of violations both of international as well as Cuban and United States laws. For instance, in United States Government note 577 of 18 October, there is clear evidence of the group's purpose of transmitting television and short-wave radio signals to Cuba from vessels. Other notes attest to adventuresome and neglectful actions that jeopardize third persons' lives and properties. In addition, the repeated violations of Cuban airspace were clearly acknowledged.

It is well known, too, in Cuban community quarters in Miami that the organization - besides raising constant funds for alleged humanitarian missions - used to charge Cubans living in Miami large sums of money for locating at sea and informing the United States coastguards about their relatives illegally leaving Cuba. These operations would include a prior telephone communication between their relatives in Miami and Cuba in order to agree on the date and point of the departure.

Likewise, Brothers to the Rescue would convey information from the United States to the terrorist organizations acting in Cuba on the location of Cuban and United States coastguards so that they could avoid them, as well as the position of Cuban merchant ships they were planning to attack. There is evidence that, more than once, this collaboration went as far as the conception of joint terrorist plans.

On a radio programme on 15 January 1996, after flying at low altitude over the city of Havana, dropping propaganda against the Government and the constitutional order, the head of that organization, José Basulto, boasted that the Government of Cuba had not acted militarily against such violations and he openly called on the Cuban people to act directly against it by means of - among other activities - civil disobedience.

Basulto has a long record of terrorist actions against Cuba, dating back to 1961, when he entered Cuba undercover, on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion, to work as a radio technician, having been trained by the CIA. In August 1962, he was involved in a terrorist attempt against a hotel in Havana, organized by the Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario group, with the approval of the CIA. Basulto has publicly recognized his links with the CIA and with the notorious terrorist Félix Rodríguez, whom he trained as a radio technician and with whom he is close friends. Rodríguez played a key role in arms smuggling in Cental America and his links with Nicaraguan "Contra" leaders Rodolfo Calero and

Enrique Bermúdez began at José Basulto's home, according to Rodríguez' own testimony before the Kerry Commission.

More recently, former member of Brothers to the Rescue Juan Pablo Roque declared before the international media that he had received orders from Basulto concerning the underground introduction into Cuba of anti-personnel weapons to carry out criminal attacks, which Roque in due time reported to FBI officer Oscar Montoto. Roque personally informed Basulto of the Cuban authorities' decision to put an end to the violations of Cuban airspace. He had received this information from Montoto, which was confirmed by his personal experience as an ex-member of the Cuban Air Force. In spite of this, Basulto planned and carried out the 24 February 1996 actions for the purpose of provoking greater tension in United States-Cuba relations and promoting the image of his organization through the creation of "new martyrs", while taking the precaution of staying outside Cuban airspace.

This is why the steps towards the normalization of the immigration flow between Cuba and the United States under the 1994 immigration agreements did not lead - as logic would indicate - to a reduction of the activities of this group, the flow of "rafters" and the alleged raison d'être of Brothers to the Rescue having virtually disappeared. On the contrary, the illegal actions became increasingly frequent and provocative. Not even the 24 February events and the late and insufficient measures taken by the United States authorities to discourage those actions have put an end to the provocative efforts of this group.

In recent declarations published in the Washington Post on 17 May 1996, Basulto said that the United States authorities had been "inconsistent" in the application of regulations against violations of Cuban airspace, bitterly complaining that, in the past, they had been fostered whereas now his pilot's licence was being revoked. Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, during a hasty press conference held on 20 June 1996 at the White House on the International Civil Aviation Organization investigation, even hinted that the measure might be reconsidered.

Furthermore, the links of the organization with United States Air Force officers are well known. According to the declarations of Republican Congresswoman of Cuban origin Mrs. Ileana Ross Lethinen, members of the group carried out a strong campaign, which she personally took part in, asking the United States Air Force to make available to them a number of Cessna 337 aircraft that, as the armed conflict in El Salvador had finished, were available in certain United States aerodromes, according to Mrs. Ross Lethinen. A few months after the Congresswoman unleashed that campaign in pursuit of military aircraft for Brothers to the Rescue, Miami Herald editor Mr. David Lorens published a chronicle with some photographs - he flew in one of those planes - in which the N 24325 aircraft can be seen with the acronym USAF on its wings. The Brothers to the Rescue organization still has the E 58 BB aircraft with the United States Air Force acronym on its fuselage.

These close and sordid links have even been confirmed in the United States Senate minutes. During the 8 May 1996 Senate hearing, when the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission received Mr. Dennis Hays, former chief of the State

Department Bureau on Cuban Affairs, Senator Christopher Dodd, Minority floor leader in the Senate and President of the Democratic Party, questioned Mr. Hays on his alleged flights to Cuba on Brothers to the Rescue planes. Mr. Hays expressly acknowledged that it was true and said:

> "Yes, I did in 1993 and 1994. My predecessor did, too, under similar circumstances."

In his declarations, Mr. Dennis Hays speaks about many more matters, including hugs in Opa-Locka between Brothers to the Rescue pilots and United States colonels during the delivery of equipment and training activities. All this is recorded in the United States Senate minutes and there is abundant evidence, including long film footage.

The defiant attitude of the so-called Brothers to the Rescue and the strong fund-raising campaigns recently carried out in New Jersey and Florida confirm that they have not stopped continuing to profit from the so-called "anti-Castro industry" and to try to provoke a United States intervention, from which they dream of emerging as the owners of Cuba.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 28 June 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to write to request that the enclosed document, containing information on the resolution adopted by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 27 June 1996 and on the rejection by the ICAO Council of the United States proposal to condemn Cuba (see annex), be circulated as an official document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 140, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bruno RODRIGUEZ PARRILLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

[Original: English and Spanish]

Statement on the rejection by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization of the United States proposal to condemn Cuba, issued by Cuba in New York on 27 June 1996

On the afternoon of 27 June, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a resolution that, far from condemning Cuba and aligning with the United States' manipulations, is oriented to the future and reaffirms the United States' obligation to prevent any incidents derived from the misuse and abuse of civil aviation. The text adopted reaffirms the principles of international civil aviation, the Chicago Convention and the purposes and principles of ICAO. According to the close to unanimous opinion of the Council members, it is a balanced and objective text.

The Cuban delegation expressed its support for the draft resolution submitted by the President of the ICAO Council because, as always, the Republic of Cuba shares and reaffirms the principles of international law, the principles, rules, standards and recommended practices laid down in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, including the rules relating to the interception of civil aircraft and the recognized principle regarding the non-use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.

Cuba reaffirms the principle that the contracting States are obliged to take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate use of any civil aircraft for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the above-mentioned Convention, condemns the misuse and abuse of civil aviation and was the first country to regret the loss of human lives as a result of illegal flights and deliberate and repeated violations of Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity by the terrorist organization called Brothers to the Rescue and as a consequence of the United States' failure to comply with the obligations undertaken in its capacity as registering State and territory of origin of those flights.

Only in the opinion of the United States was the adopted text described as unbalanced. According to the declarations of the United States Secretary of Transportation, the adopted resolution "substantively departs from the draft resolution submitted by the United States". The United States delegation was rendered entirely isolated when it tried to pressure the members of the ICAO Council and impose, by way of amendments, the inclusion of indirect references condemning Cuba.

Cuba supports the letter and spirit of paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted by ICAO, which complements article 54 (j) of the Chicago Convention on requesting all contracting States to report at any time to the Council any infraction of the above-mentioned rules contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation. On that basis, during the speech given today before the Council, the Government of Cuba followed the procedure set out in the resolution as adopted by reiterating the denunciation presented officially and in a timely manner to the President of the ICAO Council and to the General

Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations regarding future violations of Cuban territorial airspace and waters, publicly announced in Miami for 13 July 1996, which the United States authorities have acknowledged to be fully aware of since 6 June last.

Cuba again warned about the late, incomplete and insufficient measures taken by the United States to avert and prevent violations of the Republic of Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including illegal actions by the terrorist organization Brothers to the Rescue. This organization even maintains the E 58 BB aircraft, which still bears the acronym of the United States Air Force.

The ICAO Council, in an honourable act, only took note of the report of the investigating team.

The United States' attempt to manipulate the ICAO Council and to dictate its conduct on the basis of political pressure and tampering with evidence has failed.

Instead of an unfair condemnation aimed at justifying the United States' aggressive policy against Cuba, the strengthening of the economic, commercial and financial blockade, and the passage of the so-called Helms-Burton Act, which has received unanimous international rejection, justice and law have prevailed and ICAO has honoured its purpose of preventing the repetition of such incidents in the future.

The Security Council will have before it a resolution that reaffirms and safeguards the principles of international law and the aims and purposes of international civil aviation.

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Fifty-first session
Item 94 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 28 June 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to your report to the Security Council of 26 June 1996 on the reintegration authority in Croatia of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) (S/1996/472).

My Government has received the report very favourably. It supports your recommendation outlined in paragraph 44, and pledges its continued commitment to the successful implementation of the entire UNTAES mandate within the time period envisioned in Security Council resolution 1037 (1996).

In regard to the question of clarification of the amnesty law mentioned in paragraph 7, my Government issued on 27 June 1996 a list of 811 persons who will not be protected by the said amnesty law.

My Government should also like to clarify the meaning of the second sentence in paragraph 45, which reads as follows: "Several thousand displaced Croats are waiting to go back to their homes in the region." According to the 1991 official census, the region was home to 193,538 Croatian citizens prior to the war; 125,510 of non-Serb ethnic background and 68,028 of Serb ethnic background. Since then almost all of the non-Serb Croatian citizens have been ethnically cleansed from the region, and thousands have been killed. The Government presently cares for 76,669 registered displaced non-Serbs from the region. In addition, a significant number of non-Serbs from the region are

* A/51/50.

refugees in other countries. Almost all of these displaced persons and refugees have expressed through their elected representatives the intention to return to their homes in the region as soon as possible. Therefore, my Government interprets this sentence to mean that close to 100,000 non-Serb displaced persons and refugees are waiting to go back to their homes in the region.

May I request your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, under item 94 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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28 June 1996
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LETTER DATED 27 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States, British and French aircraft continued over the period 1-15 June 1996 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation. The details are as follows:

1. In the northern region 101 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Aqrah, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah.

2. In the southern region 610 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Maymunah, Shatrah, Hamzah, Qal'at Salih, Basra, Salman, Amarah, Shanafiyah, Lasaf, Ushbayjah, Rumaythah and Shu'aybah.

3. On 15 occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

4. Hostile United States-Jordanian aerial activity inside Iraqi airspace on 2, 4, 10 and 15 June 1996 consisted of 30 sorties over Lasaf, Ar'ar, Salman, Amghar and Ushbayjah.

5. At 2235 hours on 5 June 1996 a hostile formation dropped one heat flare in the Nashwah area of Basra Governorate, two heat flares in the Chabaish area, two heat flares in the Suq al-Shuyukh area and one heat flare to the south-west of Nasiriyah in Dhi Qar Governorate.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

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These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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27 June 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1038 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1038 (1996) of 15 January 1996 and to the letter dated 14 March 1996 from the President of the Security Council (S/1996/191), in which the President notified me of the Council's request for a further report on the situation in the Prevlaka peninsula before the expiry of the current mandate. The Security Council requested that the issues referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1038 (1996) be addressed in that report.

2. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), established as an independent mission on 1 February 1996, consists of 28 United Nations military observers. The Mission is commanded by a Chief Military Observer, Colonel Göran Gunnarsson of Sweden. Its current mandate expires on 15 July 1996.

3. In accordance with resolution 1038 (1996), UNMOP continues to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula by carrying out daily foot and vehicle patrols on both sides of the border between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Chief Military Observer and his Deputy hold meetings at Zagreb and Belgrade and in the Prevlaka area in order to promote confidence among the parties, improve the safety of the United Nations military observers, prevent incidents and reduce tensions. Cooperation between UNMOP and the multinational implementation force (IFOR) is maintained through regular meetings.

II. THE SITUATION IN THE PREVLAKA PENINSULA

4. The situation in the Prevlaka area has improved during the current reporting period. In paragraph 7 of my last report to the Council (S/1996/180) I referred to two mined areas on the Croatian side of the "blue zone" that were threatening the safety and seriously restricting the movement of the military observers. Since then, and as a result of negotiations with UNMOP, the Croatian army has cleared one of the mined areas at the shore-line next to the road

leading to UNMOP Headquarters at Prevlaka. The remaining mined area within the zone has yet to be cleared. An agreement has also been reached between Croatian authorities and UNMOP that has resulted in the lifting of the partial restriction of movement imposed on the United Nations military observers on the coastal road. However, there is a continued presence within the "blue zone" of Croatian military-type positions manned by special police as well as a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia checkpoint.

5. As regards the situation in the remainder of the demilitarized zone (the "yellow zone"), Croatian heavy weapons have been withdrawn from those areas which UNMOP has been permitted to patrol and Croatian military personnel have been replaced by special police. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia heavy weapons have also been withdrawn from their former positions but UNMOP has been unable to confirm whether they have been withdrawn completely from the zone. However, the permanent restriction of movement previously imposed in the northern part of the zone has eased, following negotiations between UNMOP and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. United Nations military observers, upon notification, are now able to patrol the eastern part of the area.

6. Field defence fortifications manned by Croatian special police in the "yellow zone" remain unchanged since my last report and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military units are deployed along the border. In addition, mines laid by both sides in the area have not been cleared. The deployment of forces and heavy weapons in the areas adjacent to the demilitarized zone creates the risk of an escalation of tension in the area.

7. Against this backdrop, UNMOP presented to the parties in early May a number of suggestions for improving safety and security in the area of the Prevlaka peninsula. The purpose of these suggestions was to provide the parties with options and procedures that would enable them to move from their present defensive military deployment to a normal border-security stance. While the parties have not yet fully adopted the suggested procedures, they have indicated that they coincide with their own views of how to diminish tensions in the region.

III. OBSERVATIONS

8. The withdrawal of Croatian military personnel and the partial removal of mines in the United Nations-controlled zone on the Croatian side of the border, together with the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the easing of restrictions of movement on both sides of the border, are positive developments. It is hoped that the parties, having taken these first steps towards normalization of the situation in Prevlaka, will adopt the practical options proposed by UNMOP to reduce tension further and to promote an atmosphere conducive to the restoration of the full economic and tourist potential of the area.

9. In considering the future of the UNMOP operation, it should be borne in mind that, after nearly five years of stalemate, tension and conflict, positive steps have at last been taken to decrease tension in the region. UNMOP has made and continues to make an important contribution to stability in the Prevlaka

area, promoting a better climate for bilateral negotiations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

10. While the UNMOP presence in Prevlaka cannot continue indefinitely, I believe that if it were to be removed at this stage, one or other party could seek to fill the vacuum created by its departure and the ensuing military tensions could prejudice the process of the two sides' political negotiations on their mutual relations. I urge the parties to continue to accelerate their negotiations and to normalize fully their bilateral relations, which are critical for the establishment of peace and stability throughout the region.

11. In discussions with my Chief Military Observer, both Governments have requested the continuation of the UNMOP mandate. Given that no other international or regional organization, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), has expressed a willingness to undertake full-time monitoring of the area, I recommend that the UNMOP mandate should be extended for a period of three months, until 15 October 1996, pending the outcome of the negotiations between the parties. An addendum to the present report will be issued with details of the financial implications of this recommendation.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 1055 (1996) of 8 May 1996, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 1 July 1996 on the progress made by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA) towards meeting the goals and timetables agreed between them. It covers major developments since my last report dated 30 April 1996 (S/1996/328).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in cooperation with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), continued to work closely with both the Government and UNITA to get them to implement the various agreements they have entered into. All those concerned with the situation in Angola, including visiting foreign dignitaries, have sought to impress upon the Government and UNITA the need to take expeditious and concrete steps to advance the peace process. My Special Representative recently held consultations in this regard with the Presidents of Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3. The Joint Commission continued to meet regularly in Luanda and in other locations in Angola. It reviewed the implementation of the timetables for May and June 1996 approved by the parties and repeatedly urged the Government and UNITA to carry out their obligations promptly and in a transparent manner. The Commission has also held special sessions devoted to demobilization and the reintegration of former soldiers into civil society, the observance of human rights, and other issues.

4. There have been some positive developments: the adoption of the framework agreement on military matters; the promulgation of the Amnesty Law on 8 May; the beginning of the process of incorporating UNITA military personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA); the completion of the quartering of the rapid

reaction police; and the second phase of the withdrawal of FAA from forward positions. In addition, as called for in the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA has submitted proposals to change the status of its radio station, Vorgan; these are currently being studied by the Government.

5. However, other important aspects of the Lusaka Protocol, such as the disarmament of the civilian population and the extension of State administration throughout the country, have yet to be implemented. It remains to be seen whether key goals, such as the incorporation of UNITA forces into FAA, will be achieved within the agreed time-frame. Despite consultations between high-level Government and UNITA delegations on constitutional amendments, it appears unlikely that the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation will be established prior to the convening by UNITA of an extraordinary congress in August.

6. The deteriorating economic and social situation, particularly in urban centres such as Luanda, led to the appointment by President dos Santos of Mr. Fernando França Van Dunem as the new Prime Minister. When the new Government was formed on 7 June some ministerial posts were left vacant for eventual occupation by UNITA officials.

7. There has still been no progress towards the establishment of an independent United Nations radio. However, the Government has given additional time on the national radio and television to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Status of the cease-fire, withdrawal of the Angolan Armed Forces to barracks, and deployment of UNAVEM III

8. The military environment in the country remained calm and only minor troop movements and skirmishes were reported, mostly in Benguela and Huila provinces. These consisted mainly of raids on villages to steal food and cattle, often perpetrated by persons in UNITA or FAA uniform. A total of 75 cease-fire violations was reported during the period under review, 35 of which were confirmed by UNAVEM III. However, the marked increase in violent crime is causing serious concern. On 22 May 1996, a UNAVEM III vehicle on patrol was fired upon by bandits in the area of Quilengues; no United Nations personnel were harmed, but five Angolan civilians travelling in another vehicle were killed and five others were injured. On 9 June, two Angolan employees of the Halo Trust, an international mine-clearing non-governmental organization, were wounded and, on 17 June, armed elements in FAA uniform robbed a truck belonging to Care International. The law and order situation has become particularly precarious in the areas from which UNITA troops have been withdrawn. Measures must be taken to improve security in these areas, including by extending State administration to them.

9. The Angolan Armed Forces have conducted the second phase of the withdrawal of their troops. However, 14 of the 47 redeployments which took place during the first and second phases of this operation were determined by UNAVEM III to

have been unsatisfactory; FAA are being urged to take corrective steps immediately.

10. As at 25 June 1996, the strength of the UNAVEM III military and police components stood at 7,282. These components continued extensive monitoring and verification of the cease-fire, the withdrawal and quartering of troops and police, the guarding of collected weapons, escorting humanitarian convoys, and other essential tasks. Given the present stage of the peace process, United Nations troops and military observers are increasingly involved in patrolling major routes, verification of the incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA, providing support for quartering areas, and promoting free circulation of people and goods.

B. Quartering of UNITA troops

11. On 21 May, the Government and UNITA agreed on a timetable which envisaged that the quartering of all UNITA troops would be completed by the end of June and their incorporation into FAA one month later. However, the already much-delayed quartering has continued at an uneven pace. On 14 May, Mr. Savimbi promised to quarter 50,000 troops (out of a declared total of 62,500) by 15 June; this level was achieved on 17 June. In the second half of June, however, the pace of quartering has decreased significantly. As at 25 June, 51,597 UNITA troops had been registered in United Nations-run quartering areas and only 26,150 personal weapons and 3,368 crew-served weapons had been handed over.

12. Mr. Savimbi also promised that weapons of a "better quality" would be handed over. There has been a slight improvement in their quality but there has been no tangible increase in quantity. Over 18,000 troops have arrived in the camps without any weapon and only a very small quantity of ammunition has been brought in. Desertions from quartering areas continue, with over 5,628 having left as at 25 June. It is believed that many of them are civilians or members of local militias who had been brought forcibly to the camps.

13. Nor has UNITA yet handed over any of its heavy weapons, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft artillery, armoured personnel carriers and tanks, communications and engineering equipment or vehicles used for military purposes. Without such equipment, the quartering process will not be complete. In any case, the United Nations will not be in a position to declare that it is complete unless convincing evidence is provided that all regular, commando, engineer, support and other units of UNITA have been effectively cantoned or otherwise accounted for. Another source of concern is the presence in areas vacated by UNITA of persons which it claims are its "police", even though the establishment of such a force is contrary to the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. It is imperative that these personnel also be quartered and their weapons handed over to the United Nations.

14. In the meantime, the presence of over 55,000 family members and other dependants in satellite camps around the quartering areas has added to the daunting tasks facing United Nations programmes and agencies, as well as international non-governmental organizations. Efforts continue to increase the

level of food assistance provided to family members and dependents. Some 70,000 medical examinations and follow-up treatment have been provided to quartered troops. Immunizations are being carried out in the camps, in close cooperation with non-governmental organizations and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), while civic education and medical sanitation training is being conducted, the latter in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO).

15. The first four quartering areas have been declared closed for the induction of additional troops. However, it appears increasingly unlikely, for the reasons described below, that the official closing of quartering areas will lead to their early dismantling.

C. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

16. In accordance with the agreed timetable, the incorporation of UNITA troops into the national armed forces is supposed to be completed by the end of July. The first two groups of UNITA officers have been incorporated into FAA. They will begin the selection of soldiers assembled in the quartering areas who will join FAA. The return of UNITA generals to FAA is planned for mid-July. It seems unlikely, however, that the end-July target date for completion of the process can be met.

17. It is imperative that careful consideration be given to future plans for those UNITA troops who will not be selected for service in FAA or the national police. The concept of demobilization (see para. 28 below) should be finalized without delay, as further procrastination by the parties could have serious political, security and financial repercussions. Given the conditions prevailing in Angola, the demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants must be a well-planned, gradual, and sustainable process. In this regard, the idea of creating reconstruction teams, whose activities would be supported not only by the Government but also by the international community, is worth exploring. Such teams could become an important means of promoting social reintegration, as well as the overall economic rehabilitation.

18. The demobilization process will require the provision of substantial additional resources on an urgent basis. The parties have already asked the United Nations for continued assistance to the quartering areas. The Government has also requested the United Nations to hand over in due course the equipment in them, as a contribution to demobilization. While the responsibility for social reintegration of former soldiers lies with the parties, it will have a beneficial effect on the peace process. I intend to submit recommendations in this regard in my next report to the General Assembly on the financing of UNAVEM III. At the same time, the incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA will be a difficult process and international assistance in the professional training of FAA, as well as in augmenting its absorption capacity, will be highly desirable.

D. Mine clearance and road rehabilitation

19. UNAVEM III engineer units and specialized non-governmental organizations continue active mine clearance and mine verification of access roads, quartering areas and bridgeheads. After extensive delays caused by UNITA, a United Nations-contracted company has finally been able to demine the strategic Menongue-Saurimo road. In the eastern and south-eastern regions, verification is being conducted in Bié and Cuando-Cubango provinces. Since the beginning of the operation, 4,102 kilometres of road have been cleared by UNAVEM III troops, while 3,114 kilometres of road have been verified and/or demined by the company mentioned above. In addition, 24 bridges have been repaired and opened, with the assistance of UNAVEM III.

20. So far, three brigades of Angolan deminers (a total of 188 personnel) have graduated from the United Nations demining school at Viana. Two brigades are working under United Nations supervision in Bié and Malange provinces, while the third is expected to arrive at Cazombo, Moxico province, as soon as transport arrangements are finalized. The training of a fourth brigade will begin in July. In the meantime, UNAVEM III continues to cooperate with United Nations programmes and non-governmental organizations in the collection of mine information for a national database. The Angolan parties have taken the initiative of publicly destroying some of their mine stocks. However, the extent of mine pollution in Angola remains formidable. On 17 June, two United Nations demining instructors and an Angolan member of the mine-clearing brigade were seriously injured while working in the vicinity of Malange.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

21. Two hundred and forty-three United Nations police observers deployed at 37 locations throughout Angola continue to monitor the neutrality of the Angolan police, the barracking of the rapid reaction police (RRP), the observance of human rights, the free circulation of people and goods, and other related aspects of the Lusaka Protocol.

22. On 11 June, the Government concluded the quartering of its rapid reaction police. A total of 5,222 of the declared strength of 5,385 has been quartered. UNAVEM III is also verifying the adaptation of RRP armaments to its new mandate of maintaining public order and is providing basic professional training to quartered officers. In response to a request from the Government of Angola, the United Nations has provided RRP with 120 tents, and additional equipment is expected to arrive from the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi.

23. Fifty-five UNITA personnel have arrived in Luanda to be incorporated into the national police and undergo training to serve as bodyguards for UNITA leaders; it is expected that an additional 157 UNITA officers will soon join them. A programme for the disarmament of the civilian population by the Angolan authorities has finally been approved by the parties. Its implementation should begin without further delay.

24. On 8 May, an extraordinary session of the Joint Commission adopted UNAVEM's plan of action on human rights. The Government and UNITA have promised to

cooperate fully in UNAVEM human rights investigations. In the meantime, the six human rights monitors seconded by the European Union have joined the Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM III. However, the overall strength of the Unit is still not sufficient to cover all Angolan provinces on a regular basis. UNAVEM III has continued to provide human rights training to UNITA soldiers in quartering areas, as well as to RRP. It also organized the third regional seminar on human rights in the town of Negage, while a special programme was launched in Lobito by the local Human Rights Committee with the support of UNAVEM III and UNICEF.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

25. The general humanitarian situation in Angola is improving gradually. Despite lingering mistrust, joint teams of Government and UNITA officials, with the participation of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, are expanding humanitarian activities throughout the country. Therapeutic feeding programmes have been expanded in response to increased malnutrition in some areas.

26. A crop assessment mission organized jointly by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which visited 11 of Angola's 18 provinces in April, predicted higher crop yields than last year. However, poor harvesting techniques, shortage of basic equipment and inadequate storage facilities in rural areas mean that losses will be unavoidable and a substantial food shortfall is again likely to occur. Emergency food aid and support to internally displaced persons will therefore have to continue for some time. The seeds and tools programme for the agricultural year 1996/1997 is under review to take into account the lessons learned from past agricultural campaigns.

27. Restrictions on the free circulation of people and goods in some areas continue to be a matter of concern. The return and resettlement of war-displaced persons will only be possible if an open and safe (including mine-free) road network is available. Prospects for the next planting season will also depend on this important factor.

28. At an extraordinary session of the Joint Commission held in May, the United Nations submitted a programme of support to the Government of Angola for demobilization and reintegration. Four main components, already included in the United Nations Humanitarian Appeal for 1996, were highlighted in the programme: a community referral service to ensure counselling and referral services; quick impact projects to increase the absorption capacity of the receiving communities and facilitate reintegration; a professional training programme to meet training demands and requirements; and a physical rehabilitation programme targeting the war disabled. An ad hoc programme was also prepared for another vulnerable category, the under-age soldiers. So far, less than 25 per cent of the funding required has been obtained and has been earmarked mostly for the needs of vulnerable groups.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

29. The Angolan economy remains in deep crisis. The inflation rate in 1995 rose to 3,780 per cent and, if current trends continue, the annual inflation rate for 1996 is projected to be much higher. Real wages fell catastrophically in the first quarter of this year, and the salaries of civil servants, including the police and the military, have not been paid on time; many Government officials have been compelled to seek alternative sources of income. Public services such as telephone, water and electricity have totally disintegrated in many areas. The resulting effects on society at large have been grave. The rate of unemployment is in the range of 40 to 55 per cent.

30. The Angolan currency remained heavily overvalued with an erratic rate of exchange. In addition, Angola faces a critical fiscal deficit which could not be sustained by its economy. A recent visit to Luanda by an International Monetary Fund team produced some encouraging assessments of prospects for macroeconomic reform, but these hopes have not been realized. The World Bank, under its Emergency and Social Recovery Programme, is seeking to provide a loan to Angola totalling about $20 million. The Bank, in cooperation with the Government, has identified four priority areas, namely, the establishment of an emergency fund for children, support for training and employment, support for vulnerable groups, and capacity-building for the Ministry of Social Assistance.

31. The Government recently sent missions to several donor countries to renegotiate its growing external debt. It appears that it hopes to obtain better terms by negotiating with individual creditors rather than through the Paris Club system.

32. In an address to the Angolan people on 3 June 1996, President dos Santos stressed that the economy was in a serious crisis. The "neo-liberal monetarist policy" which the Government had pursued had failed and a new policy to overcome the crisis would be necessary through what was described as a "gradually structured market". The need to restore "discipline and transparency in Government action, preventing corruption and the trafficking of influence" was underlined.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. By its resolution 50/209 B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of US$ 169,118,500 gross ($165,984,100 net) for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1996, to be assessed on Member States at a monthly rate of $28,186,410 gross ($27,664,010 net), subject to the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM III by the Security Council.

34. By the same resolution, the General Assembly requested me to provide updated cost estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1997, no later than 1 November 1996, for consideration at its fifty-first session. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, the cost of maintaining the Mission during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated in paragraph 33 above.

35. As at 21 June 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 April 1996 amounted to $46.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations as at 21 June 1996 was $1,678.8 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

36. During the last two months, the pace of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has improved somewhat. The promulgation of the Amnesty Law, the completion of the quartering of the rapid reaction police, the partial withdrawal of FAA to barracks, some progress in the quartering of UNITA troops, and a small beginning to the incorporation of UNITA military personnel into FAA, are all positive factors.

37. However, the coming weeks will be critical. The fact is that the parties have not fulfilled the time-frame agreed upon between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi during their meeting at Libreville on 1 March. Continuing delays in the quartering of UNITA troops, the high number of desertions from the quartering areas, the unsatisfactory quality and quantity of weapons and ammunition handed over, the failure to quarter UNITA police personnel and the incomplete withdrawal of FAA from forward positions all require urgent corrective action if the peace process is to retain credibility.

38. The picture is no more reassuring on the political front. The parties have yet to take a number of steps towards the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. Most of the UNITA Members of Parliament have not taken their seats in the National Assembly. Officials designated by UNITA have not yet joined the State administration at the national, provincial and local levels. It is also essential that the question of the post of Vice-President to be occupied by UNITA should be expeditiously resolved. It is generally acknowledged that the resolution of this issue could be a decisive step towards lasting national reconciliation in Angola.

39. If the peace process is to succeed, the parties, especially UNITA, must show greater readiness to implement, in good time, the commitments they have entered into. Unless they do so, the international community is unlikely to make the similar efforts that are required of it also.

40. The demobilization and socio-economic reintegration of former combatants is another essential precondition for lasting peace in Angola. National institutions are expected to take a leading role but significant external assistance will also be required. So far, the donor community has been cautious in committing resources to this process. Of $42 million required for the first year of demobilization and social reintegration, only $10 million has been received to date. Now that initial steps have been taken to form the integrated armed forces, demobilization is becoming a major concern. Without strong donor support, the results which have been achieved so far could be undermined.

41. The rapid rehabilitation of war-torn communities throughout Angola is another critical condition for the restoration of peace. Donors made important pledges at the Round Table Conference in Brussels in September 1995 to fund

high-priority projects to restore the economic viability of Angolan communities and prepare them to reabsorb the large number of former soldiers, displaced persons and refugees.

42. Although progress in implementing the parties' agreements has been slower than I had hoped to be able to report at this stage, I urge the donor community to maintain its support for the peace process, to respond generously to the needs created by demobilization and reintegration and to fulfil the pledges made at the Brussels Conference.

43. UNAVEM III has become the Organization's largest peace-keeping operation. Its continued involvement, particularly at this stage of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, remains essential. I recommend, therefore, that its mandate be extended for three months, until 11 October 1996. As the February 1997 target for the completion of the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Angola is fast approaching, I have initiated contingency planning for the phased downsizing of its military component as soon as the quartering process has been successfully concluded and the incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA and the formation of the unified armed forces have reached an advanced stage. I will submit the necessary recommendations in my next report to the Council.

44. As Angola begins to recover from the scourge of a long civil war, the need for macroeconomic reform is becoming increasingly apparent. The dangerous deterioration of social and economic conditions, the escalating crime wave, and the lack of capacity to absorb large numbers of demobilized soldiers and resettle refugees and displaced persons require that reform be pursued with determination and consistency. The United Nations system as a whole will continue to respond positively to efforts by the Government to implement reforms and encourage foreign investment.

45. Finally, I should like to pay a tribute to my Special Representative and to all UNAVEM III personnel, as well as to the staff of the United Nations programmes and agencies and non-governmental organizations, for their commendable work under challenging conditions. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three observer States and to the other Member States who so consistently support the Angolan peace process.

Annex

UNAVEM III: Military and civilian police personnel
(as at 25 June 1996)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops a/	Total
Algeria	8	-	-	-	8
Bangladesh	10	21	20	210	261
Brazil	20	9	44	1 045	1 118
Bulgaria	8	15	-	-	23
Congo	8	-	-	-	8
Egypt	10	15	1 b/		26
Fiji	-	2	-	-	2
France	8	-	12 b/	-	20
Guinea-Bissau	21	4	-	-	25
Hungary	10	8	-	-	18
India	19	3	47	1 053	1 122
Italy	-	-	4 b/	-	4
Jordan	20	20	1 b/	-	41
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	20	20	2 b/	-	42
Mali	10	15	-	-	25
Namibia	-	-	6	202	208
Netherlands	14	8	8 b/	-	30
New Zealand	5	-	10 b/	-	15
Nigeria	20	20	-	-	40
Norway	5	-	-	-	5
Pakistan	10	-	8 b/	-	18
Poland	5	-	-	-	5
Portugal	10	11	12	316	349
Republic of Korea	-	-	6	198	204
Romania	-	-	22	875	897

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops a/	Total
Russian Federation	10	-	-	171	181
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	20	10	-	-	30
Ukraine	5	-	8	202	215
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	-	-	2	-	2
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	10	12	43	811	876
Zambia	10	15	23	497	545
Zimbabwe	23	22	37	809	891
Total	344	233	316 c/	6 389	7 282

a/ Including military police.

b/ Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and Quartering Area Administration.

c/ The total figure does not include the nine demining experts seconded by Germany.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 25 JUNE 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform the latter of the measures taken by the Government of Ukraine in compliance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996.

The Government of Ukraine, pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) of resolution 1054 (1996), on 24 June 1996, instructed all diplomatic missions and consulates of Ukraine abroad to restrict entry visas for members of the Government of the Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces until further notice.

Since Ukraine has no diplomatic mission in the Sudan and the Sudan has no embassy in Ukraine, paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1054 (1996) has no bearing on the subject.

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